Grad - Lim Claire

Abstract

Each year, more than 90 percent of civil and felony crime cases in the United States are handled by state court judges. This paper investigates two different systems that are used to select and retain these judges. Under one system, when there is an open seat on the bench, the governor appoints a new judge; when the term of the judge expires, he faces an up-or-down (i.e., yes-or-no) majority decision by voters, without facing a challenger. Under the other system, judges are selected and re-elected through competitive elections.

This study focuses on the relationship between reelection rates and the behavior of the judges under the two systems. National statistics show that the reelection failure rate of appointed judges is substantially lower than that of elected judges. Specifically, we address the following questions: (i) How are reelection outcomes under the two systems related to judges’ court decisions? (ii) To what extent do other factors (e.g., party affiliation) affect reelection outcomes? (iii) Are there any differences between the types of judges selected under the two systems? To answer these questions, we specify and estimate a dynamic model of judges’ behavior using individual-level data on judges’ criminal sentencing and electoral outcomes from the state of Kansas, where both systems are used to select and retain the state district court judges.

Our findings are as follows. First, the sentencing behavior of elected judges is an important determinant of their reelection. However, the extent and the direction of the effect are substantially different depending on the political orientation of their constituency. In contrast, when the judges are appointed, their sentencing behavior has no effect on their reelection. Second, party affiliation and political climate during an election significantly affect the reelection probability of the elected judges. On the other hand, the effect of these variables on the appointed judges’ reelection is negligible. Lastly, our estimates suggest that appointed judges are more homogeneous than elected judges in terms of their sentencing preferences.