Grad - Navin

Abstract

The received view in international political theory is that a just world would be one in which each society possessed well-ordered institutions and in which societies related to each other on terms of equal respect.  Call this view Global Humanitarianism.  In contrast, some political philosophers argue that global justice also requires that international inequalities be regulated by principles of distributive justice (e.g., that inequalities between societies be to the advantage of the worst-off).  Call this view Global Egalitarianism. Many of the most prominent advocates of Global Egalitarianism rely upon what has been called a luck egalitarian account of why international inequality matters.  Luck Egalitarianism is the idea that inequalities that arise from ‘chance’ (rather than from ‘choice’) are morally problematic and require redress or regulation via principles of distributive justice.  Luck egalitarian advocates of Global Egalitarianism argue that international inequalities may arise from the unequal distribution of natural resources between societies, from the activity of global markets, and from decisions that were made before current generations were born.  Since people do not choose the distribution of natural resources, the activity of global markets, and the decisions of past generations, luck egalitarians claim that inequalities that arise from these circumstances give rise to demands for Global Egalitarianism.  In response, I argue that these three circumstances either do not give rise to international inequalities or are circumstances for which it is reasonable to hold people responsible.  For that reason, I argue that luck egalitarians should be satisfied with Global Humanitarianism.  This is a conventional view of liberal international justice, but it is one that luck egalitarians (their protests, aside) seem obligated to accept.